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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars, courts, and policymakers have long wrestled with how 
antitrust law should accommodate patents, which are federally 
sanctioned monopolies on inventions.1  The interaction between 
patent law and antitrust law has focused almost exclusively on 
determining when patents raise antitrust problems,2 and when 
anticompetitive misuse should lead a court to refuse to enforce a 
patent.3  This Article goes well beyond these well-trodden areas to 
 1. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection:  A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 1813 (1984); George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 309 (1977); see also Peter M. Boyle, Penelope M. Lister & J. Clayton Everett, Jr., 
Antitrust Law at the Federal Circuit:  Red Light or Green Light at the IP-Antitrust 
Intersection?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 739 (2002); Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust/Intellectual 
Property Interface:  An Emerging Solution to an Intractable Problem, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 363 
(2002); Sharon Brawner McCullen, The Federal Circuit and Ninth Circuit Face-Off:  Does 
a Patent Holder Violate the Sherman Act by Unilaterally Excluding Others from a Patented 
Invention in More than One Relevant Market?, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 469 (2001). 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), superseded by statute, 
Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674; Int’l Salt Co. 
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), superseded by statute, 102 Stat. 4674; Standard 
Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931); United States v. Gen. Elec., 272 
U.S. 476 (1926); Intergraph v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Berkey 
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
& FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf 
[hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES]; Priest, supra note 1. 
 3. Antitrust law informs the equitable doctrine of patent misuse, which bars a 
patentee who has misused its patent from collecting damages from infringers.  See, 
e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 139 (1969) 
(holding that a patentee may not obtain damages for licensee’s use that was not 
based on the patentee’s discovery).  See generally 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON 
PATENTS § 19.04 (2008) (detailing the doctrine of patent misuse).  While a violation 
of the antitrust laws is clearly sufficient to find patent misuse, scholars and courts 
remain unclear whether it is necessary.  See Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 
668 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[T]he patentee’s act may constitute patent misuse without 
rising to the level of an antitrust violation.”) (citation omitted); USM Corp. v. SPS 
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investigate what antitrust law and economics have to contribute to the 
core patent law determination of nonobviousness.4
Courts have developed several non-technical “secondary 
considerations” to help judges and juries in patent litigation decide 
whether a patent meets the crucial statutory requirement that a 
patent be nonobvious.5  For example, one secondary consideration is 
called “failure of others”: if a patented invention solved a problem 
that others had failed to address, fact-finders may consider that as 
proof of nonobviousness.6  Alternatively, near-simultaneous invention 
by others may be probative of obviousness.7  All told, courts have 
developed nine different secondary considerations.8
This Article proposes a tenth secondary consideration to help 
judges and juries: increased market power.  If a patent measurably 
Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (finding conflicting 
precedent regarding patent misuse); 6 CHISUM, supra, § 19.04[2] (discussing the 
relation between misuse and antitrust laws); see also Patent Misuse Reform Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 
271(d)(4)–(5) (2006)) (eliminating the market power presumption in patent misuse 
cases). 
 4. Nonobviousness is a term of art in patent law, reflected in the title of 35 
U.S.C. § 103—“Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter”—and 
numerous court decisions.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 
127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007) (noting that “the obviousness or nonobviousness of the 
subject matter is determined” through an objective interpretation of § 103) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)). 
 5. See infra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (discussing a common way 
nonobviousness arises in litigation). 
 6. On failure of others, see infra note 8 and accompanying text (listing it 
second). 
 7. Not surprisingly, courts call this secondary consideration “near-simultaneous 
invention.”  See discussion infra note 8 (listing it eighth). 
 8. First, long-felt need.  2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05(1).  Second, failure of 
others.  Id.  Note, however, that the case law does not follow Chisum in grouping 
long-felt need and failure of others as a single secondary consideration.  See, e.g., 
Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Can. Pac. Ry., 254 F. Supp. 2d 527, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
(reviewing independently long-felt need and failure of others), rev’d, 357 F.3d 1319 
(Fed. Cir. 2004).  Compare Alco Standard Corp. v. TVA, 808 F.2d 1490, 1498 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986) (referring to long-felt need separately), with Finish Eng’g Co., Inc. v. 
Zerpa Indus., Inc., 806 F.2d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (referring to failure of others 
separately).  Third, commercial success. 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05(2).  Fourth, 
commercial acquiescence via licensing. Id. § 5.05(3).  Fifth, professional approval, id. 
§ 5.05(4), which could include sub-considerations such as praise, disbelief of experts, 
and skepticism of those in the art.  Cf. Nat’l Steel Car, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 570.  Sixth, 
copying by and praise from infringers. 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05(5).  Seventh, 
progress through the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).  Id. § 5.05(6).  Eighth, 
near-simultaneous invention, which weighs against nonobviousness.  Id. § 5.05(7).  
Ninth, unexpected results, which Chisum chooses to address as a core 
nonobviousness issue.  Id. § 5.04(6)(e).  Courts, however, often treat unexpected 
results as a secondary consideration.  See, e.g., Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 
662–63 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[S]econdary considerations of nonobviousness . . . [are] 
often said to include commercial success, long-felt but unresolved need, failure of 
others, copying, and unexpected results.”) (citations omitted). 
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increases its holders’9 market power in the market into which it sells 
products or services,10 then that increase should weigh in favor of 
finding the patent nonobvious.  Using increased market power 
incorporates the predictive benefits of several other secondary 
considerations, while often increasing the accuracy and availability of 
evidence.  It would provide another tool in the patent law toolbox to 
help fact-finders accurately determine whether a patent is obvious or 
nonobvious. 
This new secondary consideration would likely not lead to an 
increased rate of finding patents valid.  Very few patents convey any 
market power at all, despite patents being monopolies on a particular 
product or process.11  Scholars, judges, and the federal agencies 
tasked with enforcing the antitrust laws all recognize this reality.12  
But this new secondary consideration will lead to an increased rate of 
courts correctly upholding truly nonobvious patents. 
In Part I, this Article reviews the common-law origins of the 
secondary considerations to show how courts could easily introduce a 
tenth.  Part II considers the relevant measures of increased market 
power.  The Article then evaluates the theoretical bases for 
employing increased market power in Part III, while detailing its 
benefits over several existing secondary considerations and 
 9. “Holders” here refers to the party that actually sells a product or service into 
the relevant market.  It could be either the patentee or its licensees. 
 10. Of course, a single patent can implicate more than one market, although this 
rarely happens.  See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1136–
37 (1997) (acknowledging that a patent holder may acquire an inherent monopoly 
in more than one market by virtue of a single patent). For a more detailed 
explanation of how a patent’s increase in its holders’ market power leads to a 
conclusion of nonobviousness, see infra note 82. 
 11. See infra note 12. 
 12. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 43 n.4 (2006); 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE § 10.3 (3d ed. 2005) (“[M]ost patents confer absolutely no market power 
on their owners.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 197–98 (2d ed. 2001) 
(“[M]ost patents confer too little monopoly power to be a proper object of antitrust 
concern.  Some patents confer no monopoly power at all.”); ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, 
supra note 2, § 5.3 (“[Antitrust authorities] will not presume that a patent, copyright, 
or trade secret necessarily confers market power on its owner.”); Edmund W. Kitch, 
Patents:  Monopolies or Property Rights?,  8 RES. L. & ECON. 31 (1986) (arguing that 
patents do not presumptively grant monopoly power). 
The fact that most patents do not create any market power has the corollary that 
most patents have no commercial value.  2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 518, at 162 (3d ed. 2007) (“Most patents have no 
commercial value.”).  “In most instances, the holder of an intellectual property right 
has so little power in the first place that the power to prevent others from making or 
using the patented product or process brings no power to charge substantially 
supracompetitive prices.”  Id. at 163; see also Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28, 43 (“[A] large 
number of valid patents have little, if any, commercial significance.”). 
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demonstrating its application with several examples.  Finally, Part IV 
considers and responds to potential objections. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS 
The secondary considerations have long played an important role 
in determining the validity of patents.  This Part reviews their role in 
patent litigation.  It then surveys the existing secondary 
considerations and the close interrelations between them. 
A. Relevance to Patent Law 
In patent litigation, the plaintiff typically claims that the defendant 
infringed its patent.  The defendant then often offers the affirmative 
defense that the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) erred in 
issuing the patent, arguing that the invention fails to meet one of the 
statutory requirements for patentability.13  Defendants have the most 
success proving that the patent fails the statutory requirement of 
nonobviousness.14  To be patentable, an invention must have been 
nonobvious at the time of the invention to ordinary engineers or 
scientists in the field.15  The jurors and judges in these cases are rarely 
scientists or engineers, let alone in the technical field of the patent.16  
Nonetheless, they must make these thorny technical judgments, while 
avoiding the danger of seeing something as obvious in hindsight, 
often years after the commercialization of the invention.17
 13. The defendant succeeds in invalidating the patent in suit in forty-six percent 
of all cases.  John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998). 
 14. Id. at 208 tbl.1.  Indeed, nonobviousness has been called the greatest hurdle 
to receiving or enforcing a patent and “the ultimate condition of patentability.”  
Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards:  Economic Perspectives on 
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 812 (1988) (quoting NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE 
ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY:  PAPERS COMPILED IN COMMEMORATION OF THE 
SILVER ANNIVERSARY OF 35 USC 103 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980)). 
 15. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).  That section provides: 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically 
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior 
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at 
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which said subject matter pertains. 
Id. 
 16. See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60–61 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It is an old observation that the training of Anglo-
American judges ill fits them to discharge the duties cast upon them by patent 
legislation.”). 
 17. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (warning against 
hindsight).  See generally Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious:  Empirical 
Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1391 (2006) (same). 
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To aid fact-finders, courts have developed a number of “secondary 
considerations,” which, according to the Supreme Court, “focus 
attention on economic and motivational rather than technical issues and 
are, therefore, more susceptible of judicial treatment than are the 
highly technical facts often present in patent litigation.”18  Scholars 
and judges have long debated the importance and meaning of the 
“secondary” label.19  But the commonly accepted view is that the 
“considerations are secondary not because they are secondary in 
importance . . . [but] because they are relevant through a process of 
inference to the ultimate technical issue of nonobviousness.”20  Of 
course, since the secondary considerations are “relevant through a 
chain of inference, their force may be weakened for a variety of 
reasons.”21
B. The Existing Secondary Considerations 
The secondary considerations emanate entirely from case law, 
being judicial elaborations of the statutory test of nonobviousness.22  
They have a long history, with some dating from the nineteenth 
century.23  In the landmark 1966 case Graham v. John Deere Co.,24 the 
Supreme Court listed only three secondary considerations, clearly 
contemplating that the list was not exhaustive: “commercial success, 
long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.”25  Courts to date 
have developed nine secondary considerations: (1) long-felt need; 
 18. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (emphasis added). 
 19. See, e.g., Richard L. Robbins, Note, Subtests of “Nonobviousness”:  A Nontechnical 
Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1177 (1964) cited in Graham, 383 
U.S. at 18; Dorothy Whelan, Note, A Critique of the Use of Secondary Considerations in 
Applying the Section 103 Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C. L. REV. 357, 358 
(1987) (“Considerable controversy exists regarding the proper role of secondary 
considerations in the obviousness analysis.”) (citation omitted).  See generally Merges, 
supra note 14.  Several judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
the specialist Article III Circuit Court that hears all patent-related appeals, have 
attempted to emphasize the importance of the secondary considerations.  Howard T. 
Markey, Why Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 331, 338–39 (1983) (calling them 
the “the misnamed ‘secondary’ considerations”); Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the 
“Invention” Requirement, 1 APLA Q.J. 26, 38 (1972) (“There is just one unfortunate 
word in [Graham’s secondary factors] passage:  ‘secondary.’ I don’t think it should be 
given any weight though some courts seem to have done so . . . .”). 
 20. Donald Chisum, Address before the AIPLA Annual Meeting, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. 
ASSOC. BULL. 618, 620–21 (1984). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See infra notes 23–26 (listing the judicially created secondary considerations). 
 23. See, e.g., Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 495–96 (1876) 
(relying on long-felt need and commercial success). 
 24. 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966).  Graham was the first Court case interpreting the still-
current Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006)). 
 25. 383 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added). 
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(2) failure of others; (3) commercial success; (4) commercial 
acquiescence via licensing; (5) professional approval; (6) copying by 
and praise from infringers; (7) progress through the PTO; (8) near-
simultaneous invention; and (9) unexpected results.26
Since 1923, the case law has given weight to the secondary 
consideration of commercial acquiescence via licensing.27  Courts 
presume that those who would license a patent know the field and 
would not pay money for a license unless convinced of the patent’s 
nonobviousness.28  Judges have noted that licensing evidence is a “real 
world consideration[] provid[ing] a colorful picture of the state of 
the art, what was known by those in the art, and a solid evidentiary 
foundation on which to rest a nonobviousness determination.”29  
Scholars have criticized this secondary consideration as also involving 
potentially unwarranted inferences, negated by such factors as risk-
averse licensees avoiding litigation30 or licensing motivated by cartel 
formation.31
Courts also consider the commercial success of an invention as a 
secondary consideration.32  Typically measured as “significant sales in 
a relevant market,”33 commercial success is relevant under the 
assumption that if an invention that turned out to be commercially 
successful had been obvious, then others would have exploited it 
earlier.34  But this assumption may not always be true.35  To address 
 26. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing nine secondary 
considerations). 
 27. See Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 55–56 (1923) 
(noting that the general adoption and licensing of the patentee’s product was 
persuasive, but not conclusive, evidence that “what he discovered and invented was 
new and useful”).  See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05[3] (explaining 
acquiescence via licensing). 
 28. See Indian Head Indus., Inc. v. Ted Smith Equip. Co., 859 F. Supp. 1095, 1105 
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (reasoning that the mere fact that a licensee holds a license to a 
patent indicates knowledge about the industry). 
 29. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 
1559, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 30. See Merges, supra note 14, at 867–68 (noting that the assumption that 
licensing is always done to improve productivity is simply wrong). 
 31. See id. at 869 (noting that rights to a license will occasionally be pooled for 
the benefit of all industry members).  See generally Priest, supra note 1 (analyzing 
licensing arrangements and their potential to mask cartel agreements). 
 32. Commercial success also has a long pedigree.  See Smith v. Goodyear Dental 
Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 495–96 (1876) (noting that the fact that a device is 
generally used is indicative of its nonobviousness). 
 33. J.T. Eaton & Co., Inc. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 
1997).  Courts have used other metrics as well, such as market share.  See, e.g., Kan. 
Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  This Author has criticized 
the use of revenue and related measures as misguided, arguing instead that 
commercial success should be measured by profitability.  See Andrew Blair-Stanek, 
Note, Profits as Commercial Success, 117 YALE L.J. 642 (2008). 
 34. See, e.g., Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1978). 
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this possibility, the courts have developed a requirement of a “nexus” 
between the invention and the commercial success.36  So for courts to 
consider commercial success evidence, “that success must be shown 
to have in some way been due to the nature of the claimed invention, 
as opposed to other economic and commercial factors unrelated to 
the technical quality of the patented subject matter.”37  For example, 
if the commercial success comes from an unpatented feature of the 
product, then a court cannot infer nonobviousness.38
The case law also gives weight to evidence of a long-felt need for a 
solution to a problem that the patented invention solved.39  This 
secondary consideration is relevant on the presumption that if the 
need in a field for an invention had long been felt, then it could not 
have been obvious.  Indeed, Judge Learned Hand considered this the 
most useful of the secondary considerations.40  Like all of the nine 
existing considerations, long-felt need has emerged over time out of 
the case law.41
C. Close Interrelations Among Many Existing Secondary Considerations 
The use of long-felt need also highlights the close connections 
between many of the secondary considerations, as long-felt need and 
commercial success rely upon many common inferences.42  Indeed, 
 35. Specifically, one scholar has argued that concluding nonobviousness from 
commercial success involves four questionable inferences.  See Edmund W. Kitch, 
Graham v. John Deere Co.:  New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 332 
(1966) (listing the four inferences as:  (1) success is due to innovation; (2) perceived 
before its development; (3) efforts were made to improve patent after commercial 
success was perceived; and (4) that other men of art created the patent first but the 
patentee was the first to reduce his to development). 
 36. See, e.g., Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 
1983).  But see Merges, supra note 14, at 824–25 (arguing the Federal Circuit has 
weakened the nexus requirement). 
 37. Cable Elec. Prods. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1985), 
overruled by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
 38. See, e.g., In re Vamco Machine & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (rejecting a patent where claims about usefulness of device were not contained 
in patent application). 
 39. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (listing “long felt but 
unsolved needs” as one of the secondary considerations).  See generally 2 CHISUM, 
supra note 3, § 5.05[1]. 
 40. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 937, 939 (2d 
Cir. 1946). 
 41. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275 (1944); Eibel 
Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 53–54, 68 (1923); Expanded 
Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909); Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 
185 U.S. 403 (1902); Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580 (1881); Smith v. 
Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486 (1876). 
 42. Both require a similar series of inferential steps.  See Merges, supra note 14, at 
831, 838. 
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Learned Hand thought commercial success had relevance primarily 
as an adjunct to long-felt need.43  Some commentators even consider 
long-felt need to be the same secondary consideration as the failure of 
others,44 although other commentators45 and the case law generally 
consider them to be separate.46
In that vein, commercial success and licensing by others are also 
closely related.  These two secondary considerations are essentially 
identical for those patentees that do not commercialize their 
inventions themselves, but rather make money solely by licensing the 
patent.47  Stand-alone research labs, universities, and lone inventors 
often fall into this category. 
Many other secondary considerations are closely interrelated. 
Copying by others and licensing are strongly linked: licensing is 
merely legitimized copying,48 while copying will often lead to 
licensing, sometimes under threat of litigation and sometimes as the 
resolution of actual litigation.  If imitation is the purest form of 
flattery, copying surely indicates another of the secondary 
considerations: professional approval.49  Near-simultaneous 
invention,50 which weighs against nonobviousness, would often 
directly hinder progress from the PTO, another of the secondary 
considerations.51  When two inventors come up with the same 
invention at nearly the same time, the likelihood significantly 
increases that neither inventor will quickly progress through the 
PTO.52  One would, moreover, anticipate that unexpected results53 
 43. Textile Mach. Works v. Louis Hirsch Textile Mach., 87 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir. 
1937) (Hand, J.). 
 44. See, e.g., 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05(1). 
 45. Merges, for example, has strongly defended treating failure of others and 
long-felt need separately and giving greater weight to failure of others.  Merges, supra 
note 14, at 830. 
 46. Compare Alco Standard Corp. v. TVA, 808 F.2d 1490, 1499-1500 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (referring to long-felt need separately), with Finish Eng’g Co. v. Zerpa Indus., 
Inc., 806 F.2d 1041, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (referring to failure of others separately). 
 47. This makes sense in any situation where a licensee can commercialize the 
invention at lower cost than the patentee, provided the patentee can extract part of 
the difference. 
 48. Unless, of course, the licensee pays for the invention but doesn’t use it, which 
could be expected to be rare. 
 49. See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05(4) (on professional approval). 
 50. See generally id. § 5.05(7) (on near-simultaneous invention). 
 51. See id. § 5.05(8) (discussing the secondary consideration of “progress through 
the PTO”); see also United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52 (1966) (finding a battery 
patent nonobvious, noting that “in a crowded art replete with a century and a half of 
advancement, the Patent Office found not one reference to cite against the Adams 
application”). 
 52. An interference proceeding is a time-consuming inter partes proceeding 
within the PTO where two patent applications (or an application and a patent) 
covering the same invention battle for first-to-invent priority.  See 1 CHISUM, supra 
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would often lead to initial skepticism and disbelief of experts in the 
field.54  In light of these strong interrelations, any similarities between 
already-extant secondary considerations and increased market power 
should pose no barrier to the introduction of increased market 
power as a new, standalone secondary consideration. 
D. Alternative Route for Introduction 
Courts might prefer not to introduce increased market power 
immediately as a standalone secondary consideration, but rather use 
it as a new test for commercial success.  Commercial success is 
probably the best-established and most-often used of the existing 
secondary considerations.55  The case law provides a number of tests 
for commercial success, including “significant sales in a relevant 
market”56 and “growth in market share.”57
Some of these wordings resemble indicia of increased market 
power employed in various other contexts.  Case law58 and antitrust 
guidelines59 have long recognized market share as a key element in 
measuring market power.60  So “growth in market share,” which 
courts have used to measure commercial success, also may suggest 
measuring increased market power. 
The tests for commercial success thus provide an opening for easily 
introducing increased market power into patent law.  One could even 
note 3, § 2.03(4)(a) n.72 (providing a case discussing the requirements in an 
interference proceeding); 3A id. § 10.03 (explaining priority rules). 
 53. See supra note 8 for a discussion of the secondary consideration of 
unexpected results. 
 54. See, e.g., Woodstream Corp. v. Herter’s, Inc., 446 F.2d 1143, 1153–57 (8th Cir. 
1971) (quoting expert testimony about a new product’s design, “it almost knocked 
me off my feet”). 
 55. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305 (2003) (describing the growing tendency to use 
commercial success as a proxy for nonobviousness); Merges, supra note 14, at 820–26 
(deeming nonobviousness the most important requirement for patentability). 
 56. J.T. Eaton & Co., Inc. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
 57. Kan. Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 44 (1895) (finding 
relevant the fact that 98% of market was controlled by defendants, who won on 
constitutional grounds); United States v. Aluminum Corp. of Am., 148 F.2d 416  
(2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.), expressly aff’d, Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 
781, 812–14 (1946). 
 59. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
§ 1.5 (1997) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/hmg080617.pdf (measuring market concentration 
using the Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index, which is the sum of the squares of market 
shares). 
 60. Of course, other factors have great importance, such as elasticities of demand 
and production.  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in 
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 938 (1981). 
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argue that, in a quintessentially common law way, courts are already 
inching towards bringing increased market power into patent law. Of 
course, no case law has actually done so, but this Article may hasten 
the introduction. 
II. MEASURING INCREASED MARKET POWER 
The federal antitrust guidelines,61 economically informed case 
law,62 and scholars63 all define market power as the ability to raise 
prices above competitive levels on a sustained basis.64  Measurement 
of market power and its shifts play a crucial role in many antitrust 
contexts, including Sherman Act section 2 monopolization cases,65 
Sherman Act section 2 attempted monopolization cases,66 merger 
enforcement under Clayton Act section 7,67 Sherman Act section 1 
concerted refusals to deal,68 Sherman Act section 1 tying cases,69 and 
damages in Sherman Act section 1 per se price fixing.70
 61. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59, § 0.1 (defining market power 
for sellers as the ability to profitably maintain prices over competitive levels for a 
substantial amount of time). 
 62. See, e.g., United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1283  
(7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (defining market power as allowing a supplier to increase 
price above competitive level without losing business so as to make the price increase 
unprofitable). 
 63. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 501, at 109 (articulating 
substantially similar definitions); Landes & Posner, supra note 60, at 937. 
 64. This differs somewhat from the often-criticized definition of market power 
laid out by the Supreme Court in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 
U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (the cellophane case), “the power to control prices or exclude 
competition.”  For a criticism of the “exclude competition” prong as misguided, see 
Landes & Posner, supra note 60, at 977 (calling the second part of the definition 
“puzzling”). 
 65. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50–51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(finding that Microsoft possessed monopoly power in violation of Sherman Act § 2). 
 66. See Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993) (“[T]he plaintiff 
charging attempted monopolization must prove a dangerous probability of actual 
monopolization, which has generally required a definition of the relevant market 
and examination of market power.”). 
 67. See generally HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59 (explaining that 
the FTC evaluates the probable competitive impact of a merger within markets that 
could be subject to the exercise of market power).  Note that the Supreme Court 
effectively ceded nearly complete discretion to block mergers to the DOJ and FTC 
with United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966) (blocking merger that 
would have resulted in single firm with 7.5% market power in groceries sales in the 
Los Angeles area). 
 68. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 
284, 296 (1985) (“Unless the cooperative possesses market power or exclusive access 
to an element essential to effective competition, the conclusion that expulsion is 
virtually always likely to have an anticompetitive effect is not warranted.”). 
 69. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006) (holding 
that in all tying arrangement cases, plaintiff must prove the defendant has market 
power in the tying product). 
 70. See Landes & Posner, supra note 60, at 938 (arguing that an analysis of market 
power can be used to resolve questions in antitrust cases). 
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A. Variety of Available Methods from Antitrust Context 
Given the importance of measuring market power—and market 
power increases—for antitrust law, economics has developed an 
extensive literature on measurement methodologies.71  The case law, 
meanwhile, provides guidance on how to apply these economic 
techniques in the course of real-world litigation.  This background 
makes it significantly easier to use market power in patent litigation.  
A full review of the economic literature on measuring market power 
and increases in market power lies beyond the scope of this Article,72 
but a review of the most fundamental concepts suffices for purposes 
of elucidating this Article’s premise.  
Few methods of measuring market power work universally.  The 
ideal mechanism is the Lerner Index, which is simply the percentage 
of price that is above marginal cost.73  If dealing with a widget maker 
that sells widgets at price, P, and that has a marginal cost, MC, then 
the Lerner Index = (P – MC) / P.  Measuring the Lerner Index in 
practice, however, can present obstacles.74  Many firms charge 
different prices to different market segments, making it hard to pin 
down P.  And calculating marginal cost MC often requires intensive 
accounting. 
A firm’s residual demand curve, which represents the demand 
curve facing the firm after all competitors’ sales have been made,75 
similarly allows quantification of market power.  This works well as a 
measurement methodology in many cases.76  But outside factors such 
as cost shocks77 or limit pricing78 can sometimes distort residual 
demand data. 
 71.  See generally Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of 
Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1992) (outlining varying 
empirical methods for measuring market power based on observing firm and 
industry responses to variations in marginal cost, responses to variation in the 
elasticity of demand, and by detecting multiple pricing regimes). 
 72. For a thorough survey, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶¶ 501–566. 
 73. See id. ¶ 503b (exploring the function’s elements and discussing its 
limitations, such as the Index’s tendency to overstate differences between 
competitive and monopoly prices). 
 74. Id. ¶ 504; see also Robert S. Pindyck, The Measurement of Monopoly Power in 
Dynamic Markets, 28 J.L. & ECON. 193, 194 (1985) (noting that the Lerner Index may 
overstate market power when dealing with exhaustible resources and understate it 
when dealing with learning curves; suggesting methods to adjust for these and other 
problems). 
 75. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 521a. 
 76. Id. ¶¶ 521d, 521f.  Note that this mechanism can even allow assessment of 
market power without the need to define the relevant market.  Id. ¶ 521c. 
 77. Id. ¶ 521e.  Shocks can include, for example, increases in taxes or increases 
in cost of inputs. 
 78. Id. ¶ 521g.  Limit pricing refers to the practice of maintaining a price just low 
enough to deter entry by new competitors. 
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Various other factors also evidence market power.  The emergence 
of these factors after the grant of a patent could indicate increased 
market power, and hence nonobviousness.  Persistent above-industry 
profitability often indicates increased market power.79  Similarly, 
when not attributable to transaction costs or market failures, the 
ability to persistently and systematically price discriminate often 
indicates market power.80  If the introduction of a patented invention 
coincides with the patentee’s successfully beginning to price 
discriminate, that would tend to show increased market power.  
Market shares also correlate roughly with market power, albeit 
through several inferences regarding the elasticities and cross-
elasticities of demand and supply.81  As a result, increases in market 
share after the introduction of the patent would also lead to an 
inference of market power.82
 79. Id. ¶ 516b.  At this point, the secondary consideration of increased market 
power intersects with one possible definition of commercial success.  Cf. Blair-Stanek, 
supra note 33 (arguing for using profits to measure commercial success).  Especially 
consider id. at 672 n.138.  Recall that many of the secondary considerations have 
areas of overlap with each other.  See supra Part I.C.. 
 80. Price discrimination refers to charging a price higher than the market-
clearing price to those buyers who are willing to pay it.  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 12, ¶ 517a, at 151. Commentators have noted that intellectual property, 
especially intellectual property licensing, often involves price discrimination.  See, e.g., 
id. at ¶ 517c2, at 157; POSNER, supra note 12, at 82.  Courts and commentators have 
observed that basic price discrimination does not necessarily indicate market power 
and the Supreme Court recently observed that price discrimination “may provide 
evidence of market power” but is also consistent with fully competitive markets.   
See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44–45 (2006) (noting that 
price discrimination alone does not give rise to an assumption of market power). 
 81. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text, especially Landes & Posner, 
supra note 60 (explaining the relevance of market shares and elasticity of demand to 
various equations that calculate market power); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 12, ¶ 532 (detailing the uncertain relationship between market shares and 
market power). 
One potential caveat is that a single patent can implicate more than one antitrust 
market, although this rarely happens. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 
F. Supp. 1131, 1136–37 (1997).  In such circumstances, a court should likely choose 
the market where the patent’s holders face the greatest combination of sophisticated 
competition and profitability.  See infra Part III.A.1  regarding sophistication of 
competitors and Part III.A.2 for relevance of profit.  Of course, significantly 
increased market power in any single market might suffice, through the reasoning in 
Part III.A.3. 
 82. Such data would also often indicate commercial success as well.  See Part I.C 
on the overlap between many of the secondary considerations.  To determine market 
share, a court must first define the market.  See United States v. Rockford Memorial 
Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1283–84 (7th Cir. 1990) (undergoing an analysis of how to 
define market in order to then assess market share).  In defining the market, the 
tribunal must avoid the so-called cellophane fallacy, of defining the market too 
broadly on the basis of high cross-elasticity, which in fact may simply indicate that the 
producer or producers have already monopolized the relevant market and raised to 
the price where cross-elasticity would make further price increases unprofitable.   
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 539. 
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B. Ex Post Measurement Increases the Accuracy  
of Existing Econometric Tools 
The best measure of whether a patent increased market power 
would perhaps be simply observing whether the patent actually 
enabled a significant and non-transitory increase in price83 above 
marginal costs.84  If courts do adopt increased market power as a 
secondary consideration for nonobviousness, they would have the 
luxury of ex post analysis.  Performing an ex post analysis of market 
behavior is obviously much easier and more accurate than a present 
measurement or ex ante prediction.  Quite simply, in ex post analysis, 
much more data is available, and the court has the considerable 
benefit of hindsight.  The econometric tools developed for 
measuring market power increase in accuracy with more data and 
more time.85
By comparison, courts evaluating market power in antitrust cases 
often must do so for the present.86  The U.S. Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) face an even more 
daunting challenge:  in deciding whether to approve mergers, they 
must often predict market power changes entirely ex ante.87
C. Adjusting Factors From Comparison to DOJ and FTC Guidelines 
The DOJ and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines suggest several 
considerations that would help courts using increased market power 
to determine patent nonobviousness.  This is a good example of how 
the new secondary consideration proposed in this Article would allow 
patent law to draw from the accumulated theory and practice of 
antitrust law. 
For example, in determining the impact of a horizontal merger, 
the Guidelines require evaluating the timeliness, likelihood, and 
 83. Cf. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59, § 1.0 (relating market 
power to market concentration). 
 84. One can reasonably assume that a firm’s prices while the market was 
competitive, before the patent, were approximately at marginal cost. See Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1713 
(arguing that the difference between marginal cost and price caused by a patent 
amounts to an inefficient tax).  
 85. Cf. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1477, 1483 (1999) (explaining that statistical accuracy is directly proportional to 
the square root of the study’s sample size). 
 86. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) (requiring 
evaluations of the relevant market and market power in order to prove attempted 
monopolization). 
 87. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59, § 2 (explaining the potential 
effects of future mergers on market power). 
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sufficiency of new entry to prevent anticompetitive effects.88  So a 
merger is more likely to be approved if the anticompetitive effects will 
likely be blunted by new entrants within approximately two years, and 
if those new entrants will suffice to offset the anticompetitive effects 
of the merger.89 One can quantify this as cross-elasticity of supply.90
The Guidelines thus suggest a relevant consideration for a court 
evaluating a patent’s increased market power: the non-entry of 
potential entrants who, under a Guidelines analysis, would have 
otherwise been expected to enter weighs in favor of nonobviousness.  
So consider, for example, a patentee that increased its prices upon 
the grant of the patent in a market with low barriers to entry at a 
profitable level.  If the patentee did not actually face any new 
entrants, as might otherwise be expected, then a court should weigh 
that as evidence that the patent led to a particularly significant 
increase in market power.  This would weigh strongly in favor of 
nonobviousness.  Viewed quantitatively, if an analysis of similar 
markets or other structural factors predicted substantial cross-
elasticity of supply that did not appear, that would weigh in favor of 
the patent having significantly increased market power. 
Comparison of actual results to those predicted by the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines might also lead courts to discount an increase in 
market power in some patent cases.  Consider a patentee who 
achieved a market power increase, but only in those geographic 
markets where the Guidelines predict such an increase would be 
feasible without the benefit of patent protection.91  In such a case, the 
fact-finder should discount the value of evidence of increased market 
power.  This is because a patent’s obviousness or nonobviousness is 
determined without reference to geography, but rather by the 
 88. Id. § 3 (“Entry Analysis”). 
 89. Id. § 3.3.  This subsection lists a number of factors for consideration, 
including minimum viable scale and sources of sales to new entrants. 
 90. See Landes & Posner, supra note 60, at 944–46 (providing formulas to 
calculate demand and supply elasticity).  Case law has also recognized the potential 
for prompt entry by others in constraining market power in non-merger antitrust 
contexts as well.  See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 
F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (rejecting antitrust plaintiff’s contentions of 
defendant’s market power in long-distance moving services, since prompt entry 
likely); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(“Structural market power analyses are meant to determine whether potential 
substitutes constrain a firm’s ability to raise prices above the competitive level; only 
threats that are likely to materialize in the relatively near future perform this 
function to any significant degree.”). 
 91. Cf. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59, § 1.2 (“Geographic 
Market Definition”). Incidentally, by “discounting” the increase in market power, 
courts would not be weighing the evidence toward finding obviousness and hence 
patent invalidity. Cf. infra Part III.C. Rather, the increase in market power would 
simply not weigh towards nonobviousness, or at least not as much.  
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worldwide state of the relevant scientific or engineering discipline.92  
Correspondingly, when a patent increases market power only in some 
geographic areas of the United States, that should not weigh in favor 
of nonobviousness. 
D. Nexus Required Similar to Commercial Success 
The existing secondary consideration of commercial success 
imposes a nexus requirement:  the patentee asserting commercial 
success must show a nexus between the commercial success and the 
patented invention.93  For example, the commercial success cannot be 
due to advertising, unclaimed features of the invention, or changes in 
consumer demand.94  Courts should similarly require a showing of 
nexus between the patented invention and increased market power 
before inferring nonobviousness.  In doing so, they can draw directly 
upon the rich, easily transferrable body of case law developed in the 
commercial success context.95
Variation from existing nexus case law might be required, 
depending on the nature of the proof for the increased market 
power.  For example, a patentee who proved increased market power 
by the emergence of sustained and systematic price discrimination 
would have to show that its higher-priced sales were facilitated by 
factors other than market imperfections.  Or, if a patentee relies on a 
favorable change in the residual demand curve to show increased 
market power and nonobviousness, then an accused infringer could 
show lack of nexus by demonstrating that the favorable change 
resulted from an exogenous shock.  Similarly, a patentee showing 
that the patent allowed it to sustain a substantial and nontransitory 
price increase would also have to show a nexus by submitting 
 92. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . 
. . the invention was . . . patented or described in a printed publication in this or a 
foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent . . .”); see 
also supra Part I.A–B (discussing the statutory test for nonobviousness and the 
judicially created secondary considerations). 
 93. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 
1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05[2][f] (defining the 
relation between success and claimed invention). 
 94. See 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05[2][f] (listing factors that are not valid 
measures of commercial success such as effective advertising, superior workmanship, 
etc.).  Some case law also includes pre-existing market power as potentially severing 
the nexus.  Id.  Of course, this Article proposes using increases in market power—not 
pre-existing market power—as a new secondary consideration.  This key distinction is 
discussed more, infra Part IV.B. 
 95. See sources cited supra notes 36–38 (applying the nexus requirement of the 
commercial success secondary consideration). 
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evidence that other industry players did not also maintain a similar, 
concurrent price increase. 
III. WHY USING INCREASED MARKET POWER TO INFER 
NONOBVIOUSNESS MAKES SENSE 
This Part explains the value of increased market power as a 
secondary consideration.  First, it considers the theoretical bases in 
relation to existing secondary considerations.  It then gives several 
actual and hypothetical examples demonstrating its value.  Finally, 
having justified the usefulness of increased market power for showing 
nonobviousness, this Part shows that the converse is not true.  
Specifically, a lack of increased market power does not indicate 
obviousness. 
A. Theoretical Bases 
As noted above in Part I.C, many of the existing secondary 
considerations have close inferential links and often overlap.  The 
theoretical bases for using increased market power as a new 
secondary consideration share much with three already-extant 
considerations: licensing acquiescence, commercial success, and 
long-felt need.  This Part considers what increased market power has 
in common with these, and also how increased market power 
improves on them as workable, reliable indicia of nonobviousness. 
1. Evaluation of nonobviousness by self-interested competitors 
Patent law has long recognized licensing by others96 as a secondary 
consideration indicating nonobviousness.97  The underlying theory is 
that those in the field, being best positioned to evaluate the validity of 
a patent, would not act against their own self-interests by paying a 
royalty unless convinced of its nonobviousness.98  The Federal Circuit, 
which is the specialized court hearing all patent appeals,99 has called 
licensing by others a “real world consideration[] . . . , and a solid 
 96. This is sometimes also called “commercial acquiescence.”  See generally  
2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05[3] (“Commercial Acquiescence—Licensing”). 
 97. See Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 53–57 (1923) 
(discussing the existence of licenses while analyzing a patent). 
 98. 2 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 5.05[3]. 
 99. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982.  See 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127(a), 96 Stat. 25, 
37–39 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006)).  Congress aimed inter alia to create 
national uniformity for patent law.  H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22 (1981). 
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evidentiary foundation on which to rest a nonobviousness 
determination.”100
Some scholars and courts have, however, questioned the value of 
licensing as a secondary consideration, on a number of grounds.  
Competitors may take out a license simply to avoid the costs and 
uncertainty of patent litigation, even if that litigation would most 
likely invalidate the patent.101  Cross-licensing or patent pools may 
even be used as methods to police cartels,102 or to enhance members’ 
ability to argue that their patents are nonobvious.103  Empirical 
evidence, moreover, indicates that mistrust, asymmetrical 
information, and transaction costs typically result in licenses on 
valuable patents not being granted from the patentee to direct 
competitors.104  Instead, patentees prefer to license only to firms in 
ancillary markets where the patentee does not compete.105  Finally, 
scholars have noted that licensees may take out licenses less for the 
right to use the patented technology, and more for the unpatented 
know-how and trade secrets that also come with the licensing 
arrangement.106
Increased market power as a secondary consideration has the same 
theoretical basis as licensing evidence, while addressing the 
aforementioned criticisms.  Consider a product market populated by 
several competing firms, all of which charge the same price for 
essentially identical products.  Say one firm develops a patented 
improvement, which its competitors dare not copy because it is 
clearly nonobvious, and this improvement allows the firm to charge 
ten percent more than its competitors over a number of years.  A 
court would correctly conclude that the patent had increased the 
firm’s market power.107  It could also conclude that the direct 
competitors believed the patent was nonobvious with the aid of the 
 100. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 
1559, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 101. See Merges, supra note 14, at 867 (explaining that firms may prefer to pay a 
set price for a license rather than incur the risks and costs of patent litigation). 
 102. See Priest, supra note 1, at 356 (arguing that it is necessary to distinguish cross-
license restraints on trade from unilateral patent licenses). 
 103. See, e.g., Skil Corp. v. Lucerne Prods., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1129, 1144 (N.D. 
Ohio 1980). 
 104. See Richard E. Caves, Harold Crookell & J. Peter Killing, The Imperfect Market 
for Technology Licenses, 45 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STATS. 249, 260–262 (1983) 
(learning from a survey that most licenses pass between firms in different nations 
despite the lower transaction and transfer costs between domestic firms). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Cf. Merges, supra note 14, at 871 (noting economic reasons why firms may 
choose to license inventions regardless of patentability). 
 107. An identical situation would apply if an independent inventor obtained the 
patent and granted a license to just one firm in the industry. 
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following reasonable, easily verified assumptions: first, that 
competitors were aware of the patent; and second, that they would 
have preferred to incorporate the patent and charge the higher price 
themselves.108  Increased market power thus acts as “real world” 
evidence that those best positioned to evaluate the patent believe it to 
be valid.109
Using increased market power overcomes the empirical critique of 
licensing evidence that patentees rarely license valuable patents to 
direct competitors, preferring to license to distant competitors.110  
Direct competitors, being in the same field as the patentee, will often 
be better positioned to evaluate nonobviousness than distant 
competitors, far from the patentee’s core market, upon whom 
licensing evidence typically depends.  Increased market power thus 
should provide much more relevant evidence than most licensing. 
Utilizing increased market power also involves much more sensible 
economic incentives than does licensing evidence.  A competitor, 
whether in the patentee’s market or not, will take out a license on a 
patent it believes likely invalid, provided it is sufficiently inexpensive 
relative to the risk-adjusted111 expected cost of litigation.112  In other 
words, licensing can simply represent the “nuisance value” of 
avoiding the courthouse.113  Given the unusually high cost of patent 
litigation, which easily runs into the millions of dollars,114 this 
 108. For what, on the record, appears to be an example of a direct competitor 
preventing the patentee from having any increased market power due to the 
infringer’s copying, see E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 656 F. 
Supp. 1343 (D. Del. 1987), partially rev’d on other grounds, 849 F.2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 
1988).  There, the accused infringer was producing the infringing product before the 
patent issued. Philips Petroleum Co., 656 F. Supp. at 1394.  Not surprisingly, the 
patentee’s profitability on the patented product “was allegedly ‘miserable’ and a 
‘dog,’” id. at 1370, and there appeared to be an “absence of price premiums.”  Id. 
 109. This applies to both direct competitors and potential competitors.  Cf. Part 
II.C (discussing the non-entry of potential competitors). 
 110. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
 111. Since most firms are risk-averse, the risk adjustment will almost always be 
upwards, corresponding to a higher acceptable license. 
 112. The expected value of litigation, ignoring the cost of equitable relief, will 
approximately equal p . d . w + a where p is the probability of invalidity, d are the likely 
damages from infringement, a are attorneys fees and related litigation costs, and w is 
the likely willfulness inflation factor that ranges between 1 and 3.  See 35 U.S.C. § 284 
(2006) (allowing up to trebling of damages); 7 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 20.03(4)(b).  
The key issue to note is that the cost will almost always be nontrivial, since a is rarely 
small. 
 113. The American rule of parties bearing their own attorneys’ fees is disregarded 
in patent litigation only in “exceptional cases,” per 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006). 
 114. Raymond Van Dyke, Functional Economics:  The New Language in Computing Lost 
Profits, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 195, 215 n.115 (2006) (citing AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 2005 22 (2005)) (observing that the typical cost of “litigation fees” for a 
simple patent case is $350,000, and complicated, higher damages cases range from 
$650,000 to $4.5 million, typically costing $3 million dollars). 
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nuisance value can be substantial.  As a result, even if a competitor 
has very good grounds to believe a patent will almost certainly be 
held invalid, it will still take out a moderately expensive license.115
Compare this situation to one where a patentee’s competitor 
believes the patent is invalid, but the patent has profitably increased 
the patentee’s market power.116  If the patentee’s competitor decides 
not to infringe the patent it believes invalid, thereby leaving the 
patentee’s market power intact, it foregoes a significant opportunity 
cost.  The magnitude of this opportunity cost would be similar to that 
faced by the member of a cartel in deciding whether to defect.117  
Competitors thus directly forgo profits if they choose not to challenge 
a patent in the marketplace.  This creates much more direct and 
accurate market-based incentives than the indirect and clumsy 
incentives around licensing under the threat of potential litigation.  
This demonstrates how using increased market power addresses a key 
criticism of using licensing evidence. 
Until recently, the potential trebling of damages for willful 
infringement might have negatively impacted this strong incentive 
for a direct competitor to infringe upon a patent it believes obvious.118  
 115. Sufficiently expensive licenses, however, clearly represent something more 
afield than mere nuisance value.  See, e.g., B&H Mfg. Inc. v. Foster-Forbes Glass Co., 
26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1066, 1070 (N.D. Ind. 1993).  In that case, the court found 
that: 
Even with the high cost of patent litigation, few (if any) large competitors 
will pay millions of dollars in royalties simply to avoid litigation.  Indeed, [the 
two licensees] have been represented to the court to be the most powerful 
bottling companies in the country, which leads the court to believe that they 
would not have bowed to pressure to take a license without first reaching the 
conclusion that ultimately litigation would prove futile. 
Id. at 1070.  Note that low royalties in a cross-licensing arrangement may often 
indicate that it fronts for a cartel, unless the patents exchanged have similar value.  
See Priest, supra note 1, at 327, 357 (explaining that profit-maximizing firms will 
typically charge royalties, absent the existence of a cartel). 
 116. As a normative matter, some scholars have noted that infringing competitors 
can have social benefits, regardless of whether they believe the underlying patent 
invalid, by preventing patentees from extracting full monopoly profits.  Ian Ayres & 
Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives:  
The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 
994 (1999).  This result, in addition to the benefits accruing to society when 
questionable patents are challenged, should lead courts to encourage the behavior 
described in the accompanying text. 
 117. The two opportunity costs will not necessarily be identical, but the basic 
analysis remains the same.  The potential infringer sees the possibility of grabbing a 
share of the profits that otherwise would have accrued to other firms.  The potential 
infringer must similarly weigh whether to do this against the possibility of retaliation.  
In the cartel context, the retaliation would be in the form of a price war; in the 
patent context, it would come in the form of patent litigation. 
 118. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (allowing for up to treble damages in infringement 
cases).  A determination of willfulness lies within the discretion of the district court, 
SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1468–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997), 
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But the 2007 case In re Seagate Technology, LLC119 removed much of 
this risk, as a patentee would now have to show that the competitor’s 
evaluation of the obviousness of the patent was objectively reckless.120  
The Seagate holding thus also clarifies the greater potential for 
accuracy of increased market power evidence vis-à-vis licensing. 
Using increased market power also addresses another critique of 
licensing evidence:  licensing agreements often do not specify how 
much of the licensing fees are for the patent itself, and how much are 
for the unpatented know-how and trade secrets the licensee also gets 
and until recently was determined by an examination of the “totality of the 
circumstances.”  See Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 792 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(explaining that many factors should be considered when resolving the issue of 
willfulness). 
In Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 829 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s trebling of damages, where the infringer had a good-
faith belief that the patent was invalid, backed up by advice of counsel, and 
proceeded to assert that invalidity defense at trial.  These circumstances resemble 
those described in the text:  when a competitor, based on its knowledge of the art, 
openly infringes a patent it believes invalid.  The court also laid out nine factors to 
determine whether damages up to trebling should be assessed: 
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another; 
(2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent protection, 
investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it 
was invalid or that it was not infringed; . . . 
(3) the infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation. . . . 
(4) Defendant’s size and financial condition. . . . 
(5) Closeness of the case. . . . 
(6) Duration of defendant’s misconduct. . . . 
(7) Remedial action by the defendant. . . . 
(8) Defendant’s motivation for harm. . . . 
(9) Whether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct. 
Read, 970 F.2d at 827.  Factors (2), (5), (8), and (9) would all have weighed towards 
no assessment of collateral damages.  This makes it more likely that a direct 
competitor believing a patent invalid will attempt to challenge the patentee’s 
position in the market, eroding the patentee’s market power. 
 119. 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  This case arose in the context of petitioning 
the Federal Circuit to issue mandamus to block the district court’s issuance of an 
order compelling discovery in a patent litigation case.  Id. at 1365.  The court also 
addressed the antecedent issue of willfulness, id. at 1371–72, and overruled prior case 
law fashioning an easy standard for willfulness.  Id. at 1365.  The prior standard 
included the following affirmative duty:  “‘Where . . . a potential infringer has actual 
notice of another’s patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to 
determine whether or not he is infringing.’”  Id. at 1368 (quoting and overruling 
Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 
1983)).  The court moved from a negligence-like standard to a recklessness standard.  
See generally David R. Clonts, The Federal Circuit Puts the Willfulness Back into Willful 
Infringement, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. Dec. 9, 2007; Kaustuv M. Das, Willful 
Infringement, Waiver, and Advice of Counsel:  A Sea Change at the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 853 (2007). 
 120. 497 F.3d at 1371 (“[E]nhanced damages requires at least a showing of 
objective recklessness . . . [and enhancement requires] clear and convincing 
evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its 
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.”).  Prior to this, the standard was 
one of negligence, with a large subjective element.  Id. 
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under the agreement.  By contrast, a direct competitor’s decision to 
challenge a patentee’s product or service in the marketplace and to 
thereby infringe a patent it believes invalid involves transfer of 
neither know-how nor trade secrets.121   
Additionally, using increased market power to judge 
nonobviousness addresses the criticism that licensing evidence 
creates incentives to cross-license patents to increase the likelihood of 
one’s own patents and one’s cross-licensee’s patents being valid.122  
Overall, increased market power has a similar inferential basis as 
licensing evidence, but addresses the criticisms leveled against the 
usefulness and accuracy of licensing evidence. 
2. Firms motivated by profit 
While increased market power’s benefits over licensing are mainly 
substantive, producing a more reliable indication of nonobviousness 
and fewer perverse incentives, the benefits over commercial success 
are primarily evidentiary.  Commercial success bears many substantive 
similarities to increased market power, and, as mentioned in Part I.D, 
could provide a route for introducing increased market power into 
the case law.  If one defines commercial success as profits,123 then 
commercial success overlaps somewhat with market power, often 
defined as the sustainable ability to raise prices above marginal cost.124  
Under the conventional, flawed125 definition of commercial success as 
revenues,126 it overlaps less and can even run in the other direction, 
since exercising market power often involves restricting output and 
thereby reducing revenues.127  Regardless of the gauge of commercial 
 121. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (noting that firms gain 
technological know-how by licensing). 
 122. Supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 123. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 33 (advocating the use of profits, rather than 
revenue, as a measure of commercial success). 
 124. See supra Part II.A (considering the Lerner Index—a measurement of the 
percent of price that exceeds the marginal cost—the “ideal mechanism” for 
measuring market power). 
 125. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 33, at 678 (elaborating on the weaknesses of 
revenue as a measure of commercial success). 
 126. See, e.g., J.T. Eaton & Co., Inc. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (defining commercial success in terms of sales); see also Ormco 
Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Neupak, Inc. v. Ideal 
Mfg. & Sales Corp., 41 F. App’x 435, 440 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio 
Prods. Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. 
USA, Inc., No. 02-0512, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14724, at *66 (S.D. Ind. July 29, 2004). 
 127. In exercising market power, a firm reduces production from the quantity 
where Marginal Cost (“MC”) intersects the Demand (“D”) curve, to the quantity 
where MC intersects Marginal Revenue (“MR”).  Provided that MC > 0, which is true 
except in the most pure IP situations, this means that MR > 0, meaning the firm gave 
up revenue. 
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success, using increased market power as a secondary consideration 
would enable patent law to draw on the wealth of methodologies 
developed in the antitrust context and thus derive corresponding 
evidentiary benefits. 
Increased market power does not depend solely on the four 
inferences that underpin the relevance of commercial success to 
nonobviousness.128  It can also detect indicia of nonobviousness when 
exogenous factors prevent the patentee’s commercial success.   
Consider an industry that has multiple firms, and suppose one firm 
develops a nonobvious patent with value to customers, and at the 
same time all the firms in the industry experience a significant 
increase in costs. This increase will likely lead to lower profits and 
revenues across the industry.129  Even though the patent enables the 
patentee firm’s profits and perhaps revenues to be higher than they 
would be otherwise,130 the firm’s profits and revenues might 
nonetheless decline from their levels prior to the industry-wide 
increase in costs.  A court measuring commercial success by either 
revenues or profitability may detect none, despite the patent’s 
 128. Kitch, supra note 35, at 330–35.  The four inferences are: 
First, that the commercial success is due to the innovation. Second, that if an 
improvement has in fact become commercially successful, it is likely that this 
potential commercial success was perceived before its development. Third, 
the potential commercial success having been perceived, it is likely that 
efforts were made to develop the improvement. Fourth, the efforts having 
been made by [persons skilled in the field], they failed because the patentee 
was the first to reduce his development to practice. 
Id. at 332.  Scholars have criticized these inferences.  See, e.g., id. at 332–33 
(suggesting that “[e]ach inference is weak”); Merges, supra note 14, at 830 (relating 
the chain of inferences a court must make).  Of the four inferences, only the first has 
an analog for increased market power that must apply for increased market power to 
have relevance.  The nexus requirement suffices to meet that requirement.  See Part 
II.D (suggesting that the “easily transferrable” case law addressing the nexus 
requirement in commercial success may be supplanted to an analysis of the 
connection between market power and nonobviousness).  The other reasons 
increased market power has significance are addressed in Parts III.A.1 and III.A.3. 
 129. Most notably, if the demand curve is fairly elastic, then the overall quantity 
sold will go down without being compensated for by the increased market price, 
thereby decreasing industry-wide revenues.  And, again assuming a fairly elastic 
demand curve, the price increases will not be fully passed on to buyers thereby 
decreasing industry-wide revenues.  
 130. Depending on the market structure and the value of the patented invention 
to different buyers in the market, the patentee firm might even find it most 
profitable to charge a price that lowers revenues even further than they would be 
without the patent. See, e.g. Blair-Stanek, supra note 33, at 655-56 (giving an example 
of how a patentee might rationally increase profits but decrease revenues with a 
better, “upscale” mousetrap).  In such a situation, the patentee would also have lower 
market share than it would otherwise, as market share is firm revenues divided by 
industry-wide revenues.   
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nonobviousness and value to consumers.131  But in this situation, 
several of the measurements of market power outlined in Part II, 
such as the introduction of sustained price discrimination or 
measurements of the Lerner Index, would often correctly detect the 
increase in market power.132
Increased market power provides courts with an alternative 
perspective on nonobviousness because it looks mostly at the external 
aspects of the firm’s position in the marketplace.  By contrast, 
commercial success focuses mostly on the internal accounting of the 
firm.133  In some cases, the external view provided by increased 
market power will allow courts to detect indicia of nonobviousness 
when the internal view provided by commercial success fails to 
indicate any.  The example in the previous paragraph is just one 
situation where this would happen.134  And in many cases, courts and 
litigants would find the external data of market power easier to 
discover and interpret than the internal accounting data relevant to 
commercial success.  Overall, increased market power provides 
several advantages over the traditional secondary consideration of 
commercial success. 
3. Indicator of long-felt need 
Learned Hand believed long-felt need provides the best secondary 
evidence of nonobviousness,135 and satisfying a long-felt need has 
 131. For the reasons discussed above, supra note 130, a court measuring 
commercial success by market share might also find no evidence supporting patent 
nonobviousness.  
 132. The Lerner Index would still detect the increase in market power, despite an 
exogenous shock to industry-wide fixed costs.  Even with the shock to the industry, 
the patent would still enable the patentee to raise its price (“P”) above its marginal 
cost (“MC”).  Since the Lerner Index is (P – MC) / P, it would correctly detect the 
market power. 
Similarly, if the patent gives market power and is valuable, then an exogenous 
shock to industry-wide costs—regardless of whether fixed or marginal—would not 
impact the willingness of some buyers to pay above-market prices to get the 
patentee’s product rather than other producers’ product.  This would allow the 
patentee to price discriminate, thus correctly indicating increased market power. 
 133. This characterization of market-power as external and commercial-success as 
internal is mostly accurate, but not always.  Some market power measures require 
looking at internal accounting data, while some commercial success measures look at 
external data.  But in general the characterization is accurate.  For example, price 
discrimination and residual supply curves, which measure market power, look 
entirely at external data.  Meanwhile, revenue, the quintessential measure of 
commercial success, and profitability are determined by looking at internal 
accounting data.   
 134. While some of the measures of increased market power involve the definition 
of a relevant market for the product, so does commercial success.  A court could, in 
some circumstances, get two secondary considerations for the judicial price of one. 
 135. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 937, 939  
(2d Cir. 1946).  Indeed, the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. listed only 
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strong support as a justification for patentability under both classical 
economic justifications for patent law.136  Increased market power 
does not address any failing of long-felt need,137 but rather provides 
additional evidence of the existence of long-felt need.  If the market 
has need for a product, then that would result in an inelastic demand 
curve for a product embodying a patent that satisfies that need.  The 
longer the market has felt the need, the more inelastic the demand 
curve will be. 
A patent cannot increase the market power of its holder unless the 
demand curve for the patented product is relatively inelastic.  Market 
power is hence consistent with long-felt need, and separated only by 
one logical inference.138  When the patentee also introduces 
qualitative evidence of long-felt need, such as customer requests for a 
solution to a problem solved by the patent, the increase in market 
power should particularly aid a fact-finder in finding nonobviousness. 
Increased market power also has benefits over most currently 
accepted evidence of long-felt need, such as customer requests.139  
Market power data are largely quantitative and reflect the decisions of 
market participants using real money.  By contrast, patentees can 
easily collude with large, long-term customers to produce or inflate 
evidence of customer requests.  Or, patentees can cherry-pick 
customer requests to paint a misleading picture of long-felt need for 
a jury.  Increased market power provides more objective evidence and 
three of the nine secondary considerations:  long-felt need made the list.  383 U.S. 1, 
35–36 (1966). 
 136. See generally A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—the Not-
Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267 (1996) (discussing the five economic 
theories posited over time for the patent system).  The patent-induced theory would 
support long-felt need, as its existence would induce the search for an invention 
satisfying the need.  The rewards theory also would, under the theory that in 
satisfying the need the patentee has contributed something of value to society.  Cf. id. 
at 316 (discussing how the two classical theories interact with long-felt need in the 
case Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., 380 U.S. 949 (1965)).  The other three non-
classical theories of the patent system seem indifferent to long-felt need. 
 137. Some scholars have criticized long-felt need as requiring a potentially 
unjustified inference.  See Merges, supra note 14, at 830 (“[L]ong-felt need requires a 
key inference to effectively prove patentability:  the court must infer that the 
patentee’s competitors, faced with the same market pressures, were 
contemporaneously trying to produce a similar invention.”).  This seems like a 
reasonable inference for truly long-felt need. 
 138. The logical causation from both long-felt need and market power both run 
towards less-elastic demand curves.  In other words, long-felt need will imply a less-
elastic demand curve; and market power will imply the existence of a less-elastic 
demand curve.  To get from market power to long-felt need, one need infer only that 
the less-elastic demand curve resulted from long-felt need. 
 139. See, e.g., Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus. Inc., 665 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(describing a patent, the idea for which was generated during conversations between 
the patentee and a purchaser), rev’d, 849 F.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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is harder for patentees to manipulate than most forms of long-felt 
need evidence.140
B. Examples Demonstrating the Value of Using Increased Market Power 
This Part provides several examples of how increased market power 
would correctly lead a court to a conclusion of nonobviousness. 
1. Creation and domination of new market 
When a patented invention leads to the creation of an entirely new 
market, the patentee becomes a true monopolist in that market.141  
The patentee hence goes from having zero power to having as much 
market power as the market will bear.  In one famous case, the 
Peelers Company achieved this feat.  Peelers developed and patented 
the first machine to peel raw shrimp successfully.142
The behavior of the patentee there bore many indicia of market 
power.143  The two main shrimp processing regions of the country, the 
Gulf Coast and the Pacific Northwest, dealt with different-sized 
shrimp species.144  The much smaller shrimp found in the Pacific 
Northwest meant that the peeling machine saved twice as much in 
hand labor costs there.  Peelers used substantial price 
discrimination145 to extract the additional benefit that the machine 
brought to its Pacific Northwest lessees.  It charged them significantly 
more for the machines than it charged its Gulf Coast lessees, despite 
the fact that the machines were virtually identical.146  This sort of clear 
and sustained price discrimination indicates substantial market 
power147 where none previously existed.  This increased market power 
should lead a court to infer nonobviousness.  Indeed, courts did hold 
 140. For more on the manipulation of secondary considerations evidence, see Part 
IV.A. 
 141. The same is true if the patentee simply licenses the patent to one actual 
market participant. 
 142. See Kaakinen v. Peelers Co., 301 F.2d 170, 171 (7th Cir. 1962) (describing the 
company’s predecessor’s development of the invention). 
 143. It had sufficient market power that it brought about antitrust scrutiny and 
remedies.  In re Grand Caillou Packing Co., 65 F.T.C. 799 (1964), aff’d, LaPeyre v. 
FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).  For a discussion of the Peelers antitrust situation, 
see POSNER, supra note 12, at 203–04.  Posner notes that the reasoning of the FTC 
and appeals court in the Peelers case has been rejected, including in his own opinions, 
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(Posner, J.); and, USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, 
J.). 
 144. LaPeyre, 366 F.2d at 119–20. 
 145. $1.10 per unit versus $0.55 per unit.  Id. at 120. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 517a, at 151; id. ¶ 517c, at 153 
(defining price discrimination and describing its significance for antitrust purposes). 
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the Peeler Company’s patents nonobvious, on both technical 
grounds and the existing secondary considerations.148
One could ask, of course, how to tell when a patent creates a new 
“market.”  Antitrust law frequently encounters issues of market 
definition and provides extensive guidance.149  Of course, in defining 
the market, courts would have to avoid the so-called “cellophane 
fallacy,” which might lead a court to incorrectly conclude that the 
patentee did not create a new market.  The cellophane fallacy refers 
to a mistake made by the Supreme Court in United States v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co.150  There, the Court incorrectly concluded that 
cellophane, a market dominated by Du Pont, was part of the market 
for flexible wrapping materials due to the high cross-elasticity 
between cellophane and other flexible wrapping materials.151  This 
reasoning ignores the fact that a monopolist will increase its price 
until doing so becomes unprofitable, which will often be near the 
point consumers consider alternatives (e.g. other flexible wrapping 
materials), corresponding to high consumer cross-elasticity.152  So the 
Peelers Company might increase its machine lease price to the point 
where going much higher would become unprofitable, as canneries 
found it cheaper to move back to labor-intensive peeling by hand.  A 
court would be well-advised to avoid including human shrimp peelers 
in the same market as the Peelers machine, and instead to recognize 
that Peelers created a new market.  In this new market, Peelers was a 
true monopolist with significant market power, which a court would 
correctly find weighing towards nonobviousness.  
2. Demand-driven breakout from competitive equilibrium 
Many patents that create market power do so without creating a 
new market.  For example, assume a competitive market for 
mousetraps, with numerous producers.  If one of these producers 
develops a patented, nonobvious “better mousetrap” that adds real 
value to consumers,153 then the producer will be able to raise its price.  
 148. Kaakinen v. Peelers Co., 301 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1962).  The court there relied 
upon technical evidence, long-felt need, failure of others, and commercial success.  
Id. at 171–73. 
 149. See, e.g., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59, §§ 1.1-1.322. 
 150. 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
 151. Id. at 380.  On the cellophane fallacy, see 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 12, ¶ 539 (introducing the cellophane fallacy). 
 152. See Landes & Posner, supra note 60, at 960–61 (explaining that the Court 
ignored consumers’ propensity for substitution at the producer’s profit-maximizing 
output and price).  Another limitation on market power would be supplier cross-
elasticity. 
 153. To add value, the invention must address a consumer “need,” broadly 
defined to include non-essential needs. 
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This does not indicate the creation of a new market, as pricing 
differences due to differentiated products are entirely possible within 
a single market.154  Within a differentiated market, a key determinant 
of market power is the ability of rivals to match features.155  If firms 
introduce patented features that rivals perceive as being nonobvious, 
then rivals will not copy them, resulting in increased market power 
for the patentees. 
This simple model also shows how using increased market power 
can indicate nonobviousness where there is no evidence of 
commercial success.  In the market structure economists refer to as 
monopolistic competition,156 each firm has market power regarding its 
own products.  But monopolistic competition is typically marked by 
economic profits being driven down to zero as other firms enter with 
their own differentiated offerings.  Firms in a monopolistically 
competitive market could differentiate their products through 
nonobvious patented inventions that consumers consider valuable, 
giving a degree of market power to firms.  In such monopolistically 
competitive markets, courts would often not find evidence of 
commercial success, measured by revenues or profits.157  But where 
nonobvious patents have indeed given firms substantial market 
power, courts would find evidence of increased market power, 
correctly indicating nonobviousness. 
3. Supply-driven breakout from competitive equilibrium 
The previous Subsection demonstrated how market power could 
increase due to a patented invention providing value to consumers.  
This Subsection shows how nonobvious patented inventions can also 
increase market power by reducing the marginal costs of producers. 
Consider a market at equilibrium with a dozen producers, each 
with a small amount of market power.  The individual producer faces 
an elastic demand curve.  The Figure below shows the demand and 
cost curves faced by each individual producer: 
 154. See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 562c, at 381 (describing 
circumstances in which price differences may occur in a single market). 
 155. See id. ¶ 563a, at 386 (observing that consumers may turn to another seller 
when a rival can match the features of that product). 
 156. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 168–73 
(17th ed. 2001) (describing monopolistic competition).  Patents are often one of the 
differentiating factors that allow monopolistic competition to emerge.  Id. 
Monopolistic competition has three characteristics:  (1) Many buyers and sellers;  
(2) easy entry and exit; and (3) firms take other firms’ prices as given.  Id. at 187–89. 
 157. Lack of commercial success does not indicate obviousness. See Blair-Stanek, 
supra note 33, at 656 (describing a hypothetical case in which the nonobvious 
invention increased profits, but did not change revenues). 
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Individual Firm in a Competitive Industry 
In this case, the firm’s market power is measurable by the Lerner 
Index,158 which is (P – MC) / P.159  Since P and MC are nearly the same 
because of the lack of market power, we can see that the Lerner 
Index is relatively low.  Suppose, however, that the individual firm 
perfected a process, which had long been needed in the industry, and 
which significantly lowered the patentee’s marginal cost: 
We can see that the distance between P* and MC
* is greater than the 
distance was between P and MC.  This increases the Lerner Index.  
And the denominator of the Lerner Index, previously P and now P*, 
has gotten smaller, increasing the Lerner Index even more.  The new 
process, by lowering marginal costs, has thus significantly increased 
 158. See supra Part II.A (referring to the Index as an “ideal mechanism” for 
measuring market power). 
 159. 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 503b, at 118. 
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the producer’s market power as measured by the Lerner Index.160  
Other indicia of market power would also indicate an increase, as this 
invention would result in greater market share and increased profits.  
The invention could even allow the patentee to engage in price 
discrimination, provided it can separate out the customers still willing 
to buy at the previous price P. 
In the extreme case, a patented process that substantially reduces 
the cost of production would even make the patentee into a natural 
monopolist.  Natural monopolies occur when average costs are still 
declining at the point that the patentee serves the entire market.161  
The patentee in such a scenario would obviously achieve a quite 
significant increase in market power. 
C. Lack of Increase in Market Power Does Not Indicate Obviousness 
This Article has argued that courts should consider increased 
market power as evidence of nonobviousness.  The logical converse, 
that a lack of market power increase should indicate obviousness, is 
not true for a number of reasons.  The data may simply not be present 
to apply any of the measures of market power laid out in Part II.  And 
at the time of litigation the patentee may simply not have been able 
to commercialize the invention, obviously preventing the patent from 
having any impact on market power.162  The patent may be truly 
nonobvious to those in the relevant field, yet not meet any substantial 
consumer or industrial need at all.  Even if a nonobvious patent does 
meet a long-felt need, another firm may contemporaneously develop 
a competing alternative solution to the same need, thereby 
preventing the patent from noticeably increasing the patentee’s 
market power.163
 160. There is nothing inherent about the mathematical properties of the Lerner 
Index that guarantees a decrease in marginal costs will result in an increase in the 
Lerner Index.  If you let q equal quantity and P equal the price that the firm could 
charge if it supplied exactly q units (i.e., P = q is the firm’s residential demand curve) 
then the derivative of the Lerner Index equals (q . [P’]2 – q .P . P’’ – P . P’) / (P2).  It is 
possible that the relationship between P and q will be such that this formula will be 
less than zero, meaning an increase in marginal cost will not lead to a measurement 
of more market power, but that is extremely unlikely in the case of the residual 
demand curve of a firm in a relatively competitive situation.  In that case, the firm 
will face an approximately linear P over the relevant range. 
 161. See generally SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 156, at 170–71 (describing 
natural monopoly). 
 162. CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 163. If the competing solution is better or cheaper, then the patent may confer no 
value.  Otherwise, one might expect competition between the patents to prevent the 
exercise of market power. 
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Certain nonobvious patents may be the only solution to a long-felt 
need and yet, by their nature, have no impact on the patentee’s 
market power.  For example, consider a patent that makes 
manufacturing widgets significantly cheaper, but does not alter the 
firm’s marginal cost at production levels the patentee actually 
employs.164  This could happen if the patent lowers only the 
patentee’s fixed costs, not its marginal costs.  It also might occur if 
the patent lowers marginal costs for units well before production 
reaches the applicable range.  Either way, the patent, although 
profitable,165 will not lead to an increase in market power. 
A patent may also lead to no increase in market power because the 
patentee licenses it to all or most of the firms in the industry.  The 
empirical evidence, mentioned in Part III.A.I, suggests that various 
factors often prevent the licensing of valuable patents to competitors 
in the patentee’s core industry.  But such licensing may occur in 
some industries not plagued by distrust.166   
As an alternative situation where a nonobvious patent does not 
increase market power, note that other firms in the industry may 
intentionally use the patent without a license, yet escape detection for 
a long period of time.167  Firms might even use the patents without a 
license entirely unintentionally: many employers have forbidden their 
employees from consulting the patent literature to avoid a finding of 
willful infringement in any future patent litigation.168  The increased 
difficulty of showing willfulness due to Seagate should prevent some of 
 164. A firm will produce units until marginal cost equals marginal revenue.  If a 
patent does not change the marginal costs around the point where the marginal cost 
curve intersects marginal revenue, the firm will not change production and will not 
experience any increase in market power. 
 165. In this case, if a court correctly measures commercial success by profitability, 
then it will come to the correct conclusion on nonobviousness.  See Blair-Stanek, 
supra note 33, at 655 (discussing the interplay among profits, commercial success, 
and nonobviousness). 
 166. In this case, the licensing secondary consideration would become relevant. 
 167. This is particularly true of process patents used during manufacturing or of 
product patents when the infringer does not widely sell the infringing product.  Note 
that, consistent with punitive damages in antitrust and the normal tort context, the 
likelihood of detection of the infringement is one of the factors that courts have 
considered in determining whether to double or treble a patentee’s damages.  See 
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (factor nine). Of 
course, Read’s precedential underpinnings were arguably weakened by In re Seagate 
Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 168. See Dan Callaway, Note, Patent Incentives in the Semiconductor Industry, 4 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 135, 151 (2008) (“Instead of looking in the patent literature for a 
ready-made solution to an incipient problem, semiconductor companies prefer to 
reinvent the wheel, barricading themselves from any possible claim of willful 
infringement.”). 
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this willful blindness,169 which can lead competitors to decrease the 
patentee’s market power.  But risk-averse employers’ distaste for 
allowing their employees to consult existing patents will likely linger 
for some time. 
Patentees also might refrain from exercising their increased 
potential market power for other legal reasons.  For example, some 
industries remain highly regulated, making it difficult to exercise any 
additional market power, whether obtained by patent or otherwise.  
In other industries, the Robinson-Patman Act,170 state analogs,171 and 
other statutes regulating market conduct may deter capitalizing on 
increased market power.  Patentees might also avoid exercising their 
market power through tying and similar behavior so as to avoid a 
damaging finding of patent misuse.172
Non-legal reasons that have nothing to do with competitors might 
also lead patentees to refrain from exercising a potential increase in 
market power.  When dealing with patents on life-saving 
technologies, patentees might hesitate for moral or political reasons.  
Non-profit and government-funded patentees such as universities, in 
particular, might exercise such restraint.  For completely different 
reasons, patentees in industries susceptible to economies of scale in 
consumption (i.e. network externalities),173 like software, might hold 
off on exercising market power while they attempt to establish a 
dominant position.174  Overall, while increased market power provides 
 169. 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying 
text.  Some are skeptical that Seagate will reduce this willful blindness.  See, e.g., 
Callaway, supra note 168, at 144 (“Time will tell whether Seagate eases the minds of 
corporate attorneys and engineering managers fearful of allowing employees to read 
patents.”). 
 170. Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (modifying Clayton Act § 2 and 
codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–13b, 21a (2006)).  Although the Robinson-
Patman Act’s reach has been significantly curtailed since Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking 
Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), by cases such as Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood 
Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007), it still has teeth.  See Clinton C. Carter & Kesa M. 
Johnston, The Robinson-Patman Act:  The Law of Price Discrimination, 64 ALA. LAW. 246, 
252 (2003) (“Price discrimination cases appear to be in [sic] the rise across the 
country.”).  Posner has noted that predatory pricing is particularly dangerous in new-
economy industries such as software.  POSNER, supra note 12, at 255. 
 171. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-204(a)(3) (2008) (prohibiting price 
discrimination in several situations). 
 172. See supra note 3 for a discussion on patent misuse. Note that current law 
clearly does allow for a finding of patent misuse if the patentee has market power.   
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2006). 
 173. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 246. 
 174. That dominant position, once achieved, might provide the basis for 
substantial market power at a later date.  See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp.,  
84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19, 26–27 (D.D.C. 1999) (Jackson, J.) (discussing court’s findings of 
fact 35, 62, 63, and others, which lead to the conclusion that defendant had 
significant market power and exercised it). 
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valuable evidence of nonobviousness, the absence of any increase 
does not indicate obviousness. 
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS TO USING INCREASED MARKET POWER 
Part II of this Article discussed the different tools patent law could 
import from the antitrust context to measure patent-driven increases 
in market power.  Part III made the case that courts should infer 
nonobviousness from increases in a patentee’s market power.  This 
Part addresses likely critiques of using market power as a new, tenth 
secondary consideration.175
A. Creates Incentives to Inflate Market Power 
Many would argue that using increases in market power as 
evidence of nonobviousness creates incentives for patentees to inflate 
their market power.  This objection has three variants:  first, it might 
create incentives for patentees to engage in activities that artificially 
increase the appearance of market power; second, this new secondary 
consideration could encourage patentees to engage in illegitimate 
behavior that actually does increase market power; and third, it might 
persuade patentees to fully exercise all the market power they have.  
This Part addresses each of these three variants in turn. 
First, faking increased market power would be very difficult.  
Market power measures data involving real money and takes into 
consideration the actions and preferences of diffuse competitors and 
customers.  Patentees can, by contrast, artificially inflate the 
appearance of several other secondary considerations much more 
easily.  Cooperation with others to increase the appearance of 
nonobviousness can occur with cross-licensing,176 copying, statements 
 175. One potential criticism has such little merit that it does not deserve 
discussion in the text:  that market power is less jury-friendly.  Leaving aside the issue 
that a non-trivial proportion of patent trials are bench trials, this objection has two 
facets.  First, juries would not want to hear economics-heavy evidence.  Yet, juries 
often play a key role in antitrust cases, and the complexity of the economics is likely 
to pale in comparison to the technical challenges in many patent disputes.  Second, 
due to the populist strain in American culture that rails against monopolies and 
resulted in the Sherman Act, patentees might hesitate to present such evidence to 
juries.  This, indeed, might weigh in favor of making increased market power just a 
type of proof of commercial success.  See discussion supra Part I.D.  Yet, the same 
objection might be raised against commercial success (e.g. defendants might argue 
the patentee is “gobbling up the market”) or licensing evidence (e.g. defendants 
could assert that the patentee was “forcing a license down the throats of real 
companies”). American trial lawyers, moreover, have continuously shown endless 
ingenuity in presenting their cases. 
 176. See Skil Corp. v. Lucerne Prods., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1129, 1144 (N.D. Ohio 
1980) (presenting an example of just such a situation); see also Priest, supra note 1, at 
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of professional approval,177 and even progress through the PTO.178  
And patentees can use accounting tricks to inflate commercial 
success179 and licensing evidence180 much more easily than they can 
market power. 
Second, attempting to illegitimately increase market power just to 
enhance the likelihood of a patent being found valid has a poor cost-
benefit tradeoff,181 making patentees unlikely to engage in such 
behavior.  Increased market power, as only one of ten secondary 
considerations considered along with the primary technical evidence, 
would likely only slightly increase the odds of a finding of 
nonobviousness.  Even if successful in defending a claim of 
nonobviousness, a patentee-plaintiff must also face a number of other 
challenges to validity or enforceability.182  In particular, a patentee 
that attempts to exercise its patent illegitimately risks a finding of 
unenforceability due to patent misuse.183  And even valid, enforceable 
patents are found infringed in only roughly half of all patent 
litigation.184  Patentees would get little benefit from using illegitimate 
behavior to increase market power and make their patent appear 
more nonobvious. 
356–64 (discussing illegitimate patent license arrangements and the difficulty 
involved in exposing them). 
 177. For example, the holder of patent A praises the unexpected, amazing results 
of patent B, while the holder of patent B praises the unexpected, amazing results of 
patent A.  Cf. Skil Corp., 489 F. Supp. at 1144. 
 178. X avoids applying for a patent that might raise an interference with Y’s 
application, while Y similarly abstains from interfering with X’s application on a 
different invention. On interference substance and procedure, see generally CHISUM, 
supra note 3, §§ 2.07(7), 10.03. 
 179. This applies regardless of whether commercial success is measured via profits 
or revenues.  If measured by profits, then a firm with multiple products can attempt 
to shift costs away from the relevant product.  If measured by revenues, then the 
patentee can provide additional features or services with the product at or below 
cost. 
 180. X licenses patent A to Y for $10 billion, Y licenses patent B to Z for $10 
billion, Z licenses patent C to X for $10 billion. 
 181. This analysis admittedly only includes the benefits in terms of patent validity, 
not illicitly gained profits. 
 182. Other bases for a finding of invalidity include lack of utility, lack of novelty, 
having accidentally gone on sale before the bar, and failure to state the best mode of 
practice. Bases for a valid patent to be unenforceable include inequitable conduct 
and patent misuse. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 112 (2006) (mandating several 
conditions for patentability). 
 183. See discussion supra note 3 on patent misuse. 
 184. Compare John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (forty-six percent of patents held 
invalid), with Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?,  
34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 5–6 (2006) (noting that patentees, who must prove both validity and 
infringement, win only approximately one-quarter of the time).  To get from validity 
in half of cases to both validity and infringement in one-quarter of cases would 
require a finding of infringement in approximately one half of the cases where 
infringement is found. 
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Furthermore, a patentee engaging in such behavior faces 
substantial expected costs under the antitrust laws, which provide for 
damages and even criminal penalties.185  Admittedly, patents grant 
their holders some immunity from the antitrust laws,186 but Sherman 
Act jurisprudence clearly does not countenance anticompetitive 
behavior beyond the valid extent of the patent.187  Illicitly gaining and 
exercising market power, of course, can harm consumers, 
competitors, or both.188  Under the theory that much anticompetitive 
behavior goes undetected,189 the antitrust laws provide for a trebling 
of damages.190  Yet, a patentee who uses illicit means to achieve 
increases in market power, and who then submits evidence of it in 
court during patent litigation, creates publicly available 
documentation of the increased market power.  This would be 
foolish, as such a patentee would thus stand a much greater chance 
of detection and thus being subjected to treble damages.  The cost-
benefit ratio of such illegitimate market-power increases is extremely 
unfavorable, and so patentees are unlikely to engage in such 
behavior. 
Third, fully exercising the increased market power derived from a 
patent is consistent with the goals of the patent system and with 
antitrust jurisprudence.  Recent Supreme Court antitrust 
jurisprudence such as Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP191 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly192 has strongly 
 185. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2006) (statutes on antitrust penalties); United States v. 
Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 400–01 (1927) (reinstating conviction for price-
fixing as a violation of the antitrust laws).  Note that no violations of the patent laws 
carry criminal penalties. 
 186. See Priest, supra note 1, at 314–16 (discussing allowable price-fixing in patent 
licenses); infra note 195. 
 187. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942).  The Masonite 
Court commented: 
The owner of a patent cannot extend his statutory grant by contract or 
agreement. A patent affords no immunity for a monopoly not fairly or 
plainly within the grant. . . . Beyond the limited monopoly which is granted, 
the arrangements by which the patent is utilized are subject to the general 
law. 
Id. at 277. 
 188. Note that suppliers can also theoretically be hurt, via monopoly power, but 
that has little relevance to the patent context. 
 189. Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 186 F. Supp. 82, 85 (N.D. Ohio 
1960) (“The essential nature then of a treble damage action [is] . . . as a deterrent 
against violations of the anti-trust laws, when otherwise such violations might well go 
undetected and unprosecuted by the government itself.”). 
 190. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) (providing that an individual injured because of 
violation of the antitrust laws “shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, 
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee”) (emphasis added). 
 191. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 192. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). 
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endorsed the legitimate exercise and maintenance of market power, 
even outside the patent context.193  The patent law itself has become 
an “anti-Sherman Act,” enabling patentees to behave in ways that 
would even be per se illegal without patents,194 to allow them to reap 
the maximum benefit from the invention.195  Overall, the critique that 
using increased market power creates incentives to inflate market 
power has little substance or support. 
B. “For those who have will have more given them”196
Since a finding of patent validity in court will sometimes increase 
the market power accruing to a patentee,197 some might argue that 
giving more market power to a patentee who has already increased its 
market power would be anticompetitive.  At the extreme, this 
secondary consideration would facilitate a monopoly consolidating its 
dominant position.  In addition to a reminder that this Article 
proposes to weigh only the increased market power rather than the 
total market power, this argument deserves a response. 
A finding of validity and enforceability does not automatically 
mean that the patentee suddenly has additional power over its 
competitors.  The patentee must still prove infringement to succeed 
 193. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (Scalia, J., writing for a majority of 6; the remaining  
3 concurred in the judgment on standing grounds).  The Court reasoned that: 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of 
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the 
free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for 
a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it 
induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To 
safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will 
not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of 
anticompetitive conduct. 
Id. at 407; see also Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1971 (Souter, J., writing for a majority of 7) 
(“[R]esisting competition is routine market conduct . . . .”).  Such case law has a 
philosophical grounding in Schumpeterian economics.  See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81–106 (3d ed. 1950) (discussing how 
breakthroughs in technology can lead to temporary, genuine monopolies, which 
then lead to economic growth and further technological innovation). 
 194. For example, patentees can engage in territorial allocation.  Compare  
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (equating patents with personal property), with United States 
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) 
(imposing antitrust law on personal property in a manner not applicable to patents). 
 195. For further recent evidence of congressional intent to allow patentees to 
maximize their profits, see Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-73, 
102 Stat. 4674 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)–(5) (2006)), which allows patentees 
to engage in profit-maximizing price discrimination via tying.  Id. 
 196. Mark 4:25 (Weymouth). 
 197. This will hardly always be true. To begin with, most patents convey zero or 
minimal market power regardless of whether valid.  See supra note 12 (discussing in 
depth the lack of patent market power).  Even if a patent does convey market power, 
then competitors can always attempt to invent around patents. 
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in court,198 while the patent law even “encourages competitors to 
design or invent around existing patents.”199  A finding of validity 
against one accused infringer does not procedurally bind others, who 
remain free to challenge the patent’s validity.200  As a general matter, 
pre-existing market power will tend already to be the greatest—and 
hence most damaging—in markets with high barriers to entry, which 
tend to be declining markets,201 which in turn generate fewer patents. 
The argument that using increased market power would have 
anticompetitive effects has a closely related argument that increased 
market power would experience a “feedback loop” impairing its 
accuracy.  Stated differently, having increased market power might 
enhance the perceived likelihood of the patent being found valid, 
which would increase market power, and so on.  Similarly, losing 
market power for exogenous reasons would diminish the perceived 
likelihood of a finding of validity, decreasing market power further. 
Several of the other secondary considerations have the same 
potential compounding effect.  Heavy licensing of a patent will make 
it appear more valid to courts, regardless of whether actually litigated, 
often leading to more licensing success.  But competitors have a 
much greater economic incentive to erode an invalid patentee’s 
increased market power than to challenge most licensing demands.  
Commercial success, regardless of how measured, may also lead to 
greater success in excluding competitors, in turn leading to more 
commercial success. 
Many factors substantially mute any feedback loop artificially 
increasing market power.  Most importantly, technical evidence 
remains a key determinant of nonobviousness, and the nine other 
secondary considerations would also play a role.  And other 
considerations also mute any feedback loop, including considerations 
of validity and enforceability, as well as the requirement of 
infringement before damages are available.202
 198. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty of proving 
infringement). 
 199. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  
Of course, a competitor must still remain mindful of avoiding the doctrine of 
equivalents.  Id.  See generally 5B CHISUM, supra note 3, § 18.04 (discussing the 
doctrine of equivalents). 
 200. Boutell v. Volk, 449 F.2d 673, 678 (10th Cir. 1971). 
 201. POSNER, supra note 12, at 74.  Those high technology markets that have high 
fixed costs will be a notable exception to this general rule.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 2000) (discussing the effects of high 
fixed costs in high technology markets). 
 202. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text. 
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The lack of an inference of obviousness from no increased market 
power precludes a feedback loop decreasing market power.  Two 
structural factors limit any feedback loop increasing market power.203  
First, increased market power typically comes with higher profits, 
giving competitors and new entrants an incentive to frequently 
reevaluate the technical merit of the patent and reweigh the costs 
and benefits of challenging it.  Second, the uncertainty of patent 
litigation, combined with the fact that a single verdict of invalidity 
binds the patentee, will limit the likelihood of patentees over-
asserting their patents.204  Overall, using increased market power to 
determine nonobviousness will not give more market power to those 
who already possess it. 
C. Conflicts with Prospect Theory 
The prospect theory of patent economics205 conceives of patents as 
analogous to the grants of mining rights on federal lands, which 
encourage prospecting and mining.206  By granting property rights on 
the patented invention, the government encourages investment in its 
commercialization and orderly improvement.207  Prospect theory has 
had the most academic success of any of the non-classical theories of 
patent economics.208  And some commentators argue that it has 
impacted the jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit.209  Notably, 
 203. Feedback loops in both directions, moreover, are dampened by the wide 
range of considerations that go into a finding of nonobviousness, including other 
secondary considerations and a full analysis of the technical background.  An 
increase in market power by itself would probably increase the probability of finding 
the patent valid by relatively little, and the feedback back into market power seems 
intuitively likely to be perhaps an order of magnitude lower than the first increase. 
 204. See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 116, at 986–87 (making a related point 
that uncertainty and cost in patent litigation prevent full extraction of the patent 
monopoly). 
 205. This prospect theory has no relation to the area of behavioral economics by 
the same name.  For a general overview of prospect theory, see Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 
263 (1979). 
 206. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 266 (1977) (first putting forward the prospect theory). 
 207. Id. 
 208. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention:  A 
Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 14 (2000) (noting that classical reward-based theory 
and prospect theory are “[t]he two predominant economic theories of patents”). 
 209. Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit’s Patent Nonobviousness Standards:  
Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1051, 1094–1100 
(1991).  In addition to producing reasoning and results consistent with prospect 
theory, several Federal Circuit cases have cited directly to Kitch’s seminal 1977 
article.  E.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 640 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev’d on 
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prospect theory strongly supports the use of commercial success in 
deciding whether to uphold a patent,210 and the Federal Circuit has 
placed increasing weight on commercial success.211
But prospect theory’s predictions are starkly at odds with using 
increased market power in determining patent validity.  Prospect 
theory specifically envisions and presumes that patentees face a 
nearly horizontal demand curve.212  Such a curve, of course, implies 
that patentees have no market power, so no increased market power 
would ever be measured. 
Prospect theory, however, has a basis in neither statute nor 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Scholars have criticized prospect 
theory on many points.213  Indeed, if courts do adopt increased 
market power as a secondary consideration, then litigants may well 
introduce market-power evidence in court that demonstrates that 
patentees face demand curves that are not nearly horizontal, as 
prospect theory predicts.  If such evidence were indeed introduced, it 
would provide scholars with hard data disproving key tenets of 
prospect theory.  Using increased market power as a new, tenth 
secondary consideration for patent validity would thus have the 
other grounds, 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 
62 F.3d 1512, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 210. Prospect theory supports the use of commercial success to demonstrate 
nonobviousness because it indicates that the patent serves as the “foundation for a 
series of now valuable contract rights” formed in reliance on its validity.  Kitch, supra 
note 206, at 283; see also Oddi, supra note 136, at 281–82 (providing a brief 
introduction to prospect theory. 
 211. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 55, at 305; Merges, supra note 14, at 
820–26. 
 212. See Kitch, supra note 206, at 274; Oddi, supra note 136, at 281 (stating how far 
the Federal Circuit has gone in augmenting the importance of commercial success). 
 213. See, e.g., Roger L. Beck, The Prospect Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive 
Competition, 5 RES. L. & ECON. 193, 196–97 (1983) (challenging Kitch’s assumptions 
that patents protect future developments); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the 
Progress of Science:  Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1043 
(1989) (finding no support for the theory in judicial decisions); Shubha Ghosh, 
Patents and the Regulatory State:  Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1353–57 (2004) (arguing that prospect theory has an 
unrealistic view of inventors as risk-averse and incorrectly assumes that 
commercialization furthers social good); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On 
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 868-76 (1990) (“The real 
problem is not controlling overfishing, but preventing underfishing after exclusive 
rights have been granted.”); Oddi, supra note 136, at 282 (arguing that the theory 
has had no success in predicting the outcome of individual patent cases); Frederic M. 
Scherer, Comment on Edmund Kitch, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 51, 52 (1986) (specifically 
criticizing the horizontal demand curve assumption).  Indeed, some scholars have 
questioned what value economics has to the study of patent law.  E.g., George L. 
Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property:  Comment on Cheung, 
8 RES. L. & ECON. 19, 24 (1986) (“I believe there is little hope that economic analysis 
can resolve the question of the appropriate scope of the protection of intellectual 
property.”). 
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beneficial side-effect of providing scholars with empirical data with 
which to test prospect theory.  
CONCLUSION 
The importance of market power to antitrust law has led to a 
wealth of theories and methodologies for measuring it.  Patent law’s 
key factual inquiry of nonobviousness could gain from using these 
tools.  Increased market power builds upon and enhances several 
related secondary considerations.  It substantively improves on 
licensing acquiescence, while providing evidentiary benefits over 
commercial success.  It also helps to detect long-felt need.  Increased 
market power will often provide quantitative evidence that is more 
difficult to manipulate, but easier to obtain, than many of the existing 
secondary considerations.214
Increased market power’s close relation to three already-existing 
secondary considerations should not prevent it from becoming a 
standalone tenth consideration.  Many of the existing considerations 
overlap extensively.  Increased market power’s overlap with 
commercial success provides an alternative route into the case law, as 
another way to measure commercial success.  Compared to 
commercial success, increased market power has a broader 
inferential basis and will frequently offer additional, more reliable 
evidence.  Courts determining patent validity will make more 
accurate decisions if they can draw on the economic tools of antitrust 
law. 
 
 214. Cf. Priest, supra note 1, at 326 (making a similar argument about the value of 
market data in detecting cartels versus the more qualitative evidence of “intent”).  
Note that often, the best qualitative evidence regarding nonobviousness might 
remain outside the reach of litigators, if internal to third parties to the litigation.  For 
example, consider internal emails sent between engineers at a competitor who is not 
party to litigation.  Cf. Am. Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(demonstrating the difficulty of discovering a non-party’s internal records). 
